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BOOK REVIEW
AN ASSAULT ON THE TEMPLE OF
MIRANDA
CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE

LAW. By Joseph D. Grano. The Univer-

sity of Michigan Press 1993. Pp. 336.
GEORGE C. THOMAS

M*

Everyone who has an interest in the criminal justice system
should read Joseph Grano's new book, Confessions, Truth, and the Law.
In laying the foundation for analyzing the law of confessions, Grano
first presents a thoughtful discussion of the American criminal justice
system, concluding that while the system has many objectives, the
search for truth is a dominant objective (not the dominant objective,
he assures the reader, only a dominant objective).1 The objective of
seeking truth through the justice system informs the rest of the book.
Everyonewho has thought about the law of confessions, the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 2 or Miranda v. Aizona? will read Grano's book with great interest. He thinks and writes
clearly. He skillfully canvasses the dialectic about confessions that has
persisted in Anglo-American law for at least three centuries. The
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Newark. I thankJosh Dressier,
Don Dripps, Scott Gould, Doug Husak, Yale Kamisar, Lynn Miller, Sam Pillsbury, Mike
Seidman, and Bill Stuntz for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1 JOSEPH D. GRAo, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 6 (1993).
2 The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. This provision is
often loosely termed a "privilege against self-incrimination." The usage is loose because
the Fifth Amendment grants a right not to be compelled, rather than a privilege in the
true sense. The usage probably derives from the historical application of the Fifth Amendment in the courtroom. In this context, merely calling defendants to testify is conclusively
presumed to be compelling them to be witnesses, making the Fifth Amendment operate as
a privilege. Outside the courtroom, individuals must prove that their testimony was compelled. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 (1976) (rejecting defendant's
claim of privilege concerning business records which he "had voluntarily committed to
writing").
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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book thus serves as an invaluable reference-the Table of Authorities,
the Table of Cases, and the rich endnotes are alone worth the price of
4
admission.
But Grano's book is much more than a reference work. He does
not shy away from controversial positions, and his attack on the rather
smug, self-satisfied current attitude toward the law of confessions
comes as a breath of fresh air. It also comes as an assault on the temple of Miranda. Though I have sought to defend Miranda'sphilosoph6
ical premises,5 I recently published a tentative criticism of Miranda,
and am in the process of examining the empirical hypothesis that Miranda may ultimately make little or no difference in the percentage of
suspects who incriminate themselves during interrogation. 7 Thus, I
approached Grano's book as a test of my fidelity to Miranda. This
review contains the results of that test.
I.

GRANo's ETHIcAL. PREMISE

Grano begins with an ethical premise: Far from being ethically or
normatively bad (as many critics seem implicitly to believe), police interrogation is an important adjunct to the justice system's ascertainment of truth. To ascertain the truth about who committed a
particular crime is ethically good in two related ways: it avoids having
the wrong person charged with a crime, while simultaneously identifying someone who deserves punishment and may need to be incapacitated. Thus, as long as the method of conducting the interrogation
comports with whatever are the appropriate standards, the system
should not disable police interrogators.
This ethical premise cuts through some of the foggy thinking that
attends the Mirandadebate, but ultimately it merely restates the crucial question: what are the appropriate standards for police interrogation? Grano notes that two standards were subsumed under the
common-law rubric of "voluntariness." One is the right not to be coerced into confessing; Grano calls this a "volitional or mental freedom
4 Is it not late in the day for endnotes? Having become accustomed to footnotes in
this computer age, the endnotes were quite frustrating, all the more so because readers will
want to examine Grano's notes carefully.
5 George C. Thomas Ill, A PhilosophicalAccount of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE J.L.
& HuMAN. 79 (1993); George C. Thomas I & Marshall D. Bilder, Aristotle'sParadoxand the
Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82J. CrM. L. & CRMINOLOGY 243 (1991).
6 George C. Thomas III, Laying Bare the Failure of Criminal ProcedureDoctrine, 4 CaM.
L.F. 535 (1993) (reviewing JosHuA DREssLuR, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(1991)).
7 George C. Thomas III, Is MirandaA Real-World Failure? (draft manuscript available
from author).
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concern."8 The other standard is the right not to have police use tactics that result in "unfair advantage or improper exploitation." 9
The "unfairness" standard captures a dimension of voluntariness
quite different from coercion. Consider Grano's example of an unfair
procedure that would not be coercive: "a police officer may not procure a suspect's confession by pretending to be a chaplain or a defense lawyer."1 0 Because coercion requires an overbearing of the will
of the coerced party," this kind of trickery is the antithesis of coercion; it depends on the suspect not perceiving the hand of the police
12
in the charade.
Grano would admit any confession that met this two-pronged voluntariness standard.' 3 If the police neither coerced nor took unfair
advantage of the suspect, the resulting confession is almost certainly
some version of the truth. Given the importance of truth-seeking in
the criminal justice system, on what ethical grounds should courts suppress this confession?
The constraints on interrogation emanating from the Constitution may, of course, be more intrusive than those suggested by an ethical analysis. There is no perfect congruence between ethics and law.
On the other hand, ethics and law are more closely related than many
traditionalists seem to think.
Indeed, on Ronald Dworkin's account of interpretation, ethics
14
play a major role in deciding what constitutional provisions mean.
In Dworkin's view, interpretation requires two stages. If more than
one interpretation survives the threshold test of fit, the judge at the
second stage must decide which interpretation "shows the community's structure of institutions and decisions-its public standards as a
whole-in a better light from the standpoint of political morality."' 5
Though this concept is a bit fuzzy in the abstract, its application is less
mysterious.
8 GRANo, supra note 1, at 99.
9 Id. at 109. Whatever uncertainty inheres in the notion of coercion, "unfair advantage" is more open-ended. It may even "seem hopelessly subjective," as Grano puts it. Id.
at 81.
10 Id. (citing FRED INaAu ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 216-17 (3d
ed. 1986)). Grano states that the hypothetical facts were "originally suggested" in a 1981
case. Id. at n.139. But the chaplain aspect of the hypothetical appears in a 1963 paper by
Yale Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary"Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Ciiminal lntemgation and Confessions, 17 RurGRms L. REv. 728 (1963), reprinted in YALE KAMiSdA,
PoncE INTERROcATION AND CONFESSIONS 15 (1980).

11 See Thomas, supranote 5, at 85.
12 See, e.g., GRANO, supra note 1, at 109.
13 See supra text accompanying notes 8 to 9.
14 RONALD DwoRIaN, LAw's EMPImR (1986).
I5 Id. at 256.
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For example, Wigmore identified two ways of deciding which confessions to suppress: (1) whether the confession was trustworthy; (2)
whether the confession was the free choice of the confessor. 16 The
trustworthiness test asks whether the facts surrounding the confession
suggest that it was false; though this test is probably more restrictive
than the coercion prong of Grano's voluntariness test, it is similar.
The free-choice test asks whether the suspect gave the confession
freely, without inducement or improper influence.' 7 This is close to
the Miranda view; indeed, the Miranda opinion contains similar
language. 18
Assume that both tests pass Dworkin's test of fit as eligible interpretations of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination.' 9 Now consider a hypothetical: the police interrogate
a suspect (S) for several hours while she is being held in detention
and not permitted to see her lawyer. Under the free-choice test, this
confession might be inadmissible. Under the trustworthiness test,
however, S's confession seems admissible; the facts do not suggest
pressure of the sort that would make a suspect give an untrue
confession.
Because both eligible interpretations of the privilege give a different answer in S's case, it is necessary to decide which interpretation
shows the criminal justice system in a better light from the standpoint
of political morality. At this second stage of Dworkin's analysis, it is
necessary to characterize the police interrogation as either ethically
good or ethically bad. To broaden the analysis beyond S's case, this
ethical issue will arise whenever interrogation produces different an16 2JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 824, 826 (J. Chadbourn
rev. 1981). Though Wigmore called the second test "voluntariness," his usage of"voluntariness" is different than Grano's, and this review uses "free choice" to differentiate the two
kinds of voluntariness.
17 Id. § 826.
18 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (in the cases before the Court,

no "appropriate safeguards" were taken "to insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice"); id. at 458 (without "adequate protective devices" during custodial
interrogation, "no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his
free choice"); id. at 464-65 (equating involuntariness doctrine with interrogation practices
that "disable" an individual "from making a free and rational choice"); id. (equating a
suspect's "constitutional privilege" with "the choice on his part to speak to the police,"

which must be an "independent decision" untainted by the "compelling atmosphere of the
in-custody interrogation"); id. at 467 (without warnings, pressures exist which "compel" the
suspect to speak "where he would not otherwise do so freely").
19 Wigmore considered these tests only on the issue of the common-law confessions

doctrine because he interpreted the Fifth Amendment privilege much more narrowly.
Since Wigmore's time, however, the Supreme Court has effectively merged the commonlaw confessions doctrine into the Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).

So for the sake of illustration, Wigmore's tests can serve as

interpretations of the privilege.
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swers under the two eligible interpretations.
Both tests would find a violation when the interrogation is likely
to produce false confessions; it is difficult to imagine a suspect making
a free choice when facing a set of constraints likely to produce a false
confession. Similarly, the presence of a free choice means that the
false-confession test is always satisfied. On these assumptions, the ethical inquiry is required by the category of police interrogation which
produces a response that is trustworthy but unfree. 20 Is this category
of police interrogation ethically good or ethically bad? The answer
will determine which of the two eligible interpretations is better.
On this view of interpretation, an ethical inquiry cannot be
avoided when more than one interpretation is eligible. Thus, the next
task is to examine Grano's ethical premise in more detail and consider whether constitutional limitations on interrogation beyond
those inherent in the voluntariness doctrine can survive Grano's ethical critique. Finally, Part IV contains the perhaps surprising argument
that not much would change if the Supreme Court overruled Miranda.
II.

GRANo's ETHicAL

PREMISE

ExAMINED

After finding truth to be a dominant objective of the criminal
justice system, Grano attacks the various arguments offered to support
hostility toward police interrogation. Part I argues that an ethical inquiry is central to arriving at the best interpretation of the law of confessions. The debate about whether police interrogation should be
tightly controlled or encouraged is precisely that ethical inquiry.
Perhaps it is the growing conservatism in the country in the
1990s, perhaps it is my own middle-age crisis with conservatism, but
Grano's counter-arguments on this point seem more persuasive than
Fred Inbau's from a generation ago.2 1 There is value in having the
police solve crimes; there is value in permitting the police to talk to
suspects. On the surface, therefore, it seems wrong to suggest that
police interrogation which produces a trustworthy, voluntary confession causes a greater harm (to the system, to the country, to notions of
fair play and equal treatment) than would a non-trivial loss of confessions resulting from additional limitations on interrogation.
Grano is correct that some of the traditional arguments against
police interrogation do not withstand an ethical scrutiny. For in20 The best account of when acts-are unfree is Harry Frankfurt's. See Harry G. Frankfurt, Coercion and Moral Responsibility, in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 26

(1988).
21 See, e.g., Fred E. Inbau, Police Interrogation-APracticalNecessity, 52J. CraM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. 16 (1961).
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stance, the Court and commentators have stated that the Constitution
should protect suspects from making an ill-advised choice in the interrogation room because this choice can effectively deprive those suspects of their chance to succeed at trial. 2 2 But Grano wonders why
guilty suspects should succeed at trial. Calling this the "fox-hunter's"
argument, or sporting theory of justice, Grano exposes its weakness.
Nothing-not even the tired cliche that the United States has an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system ofjustice-will make this argument work once it is exposed as a call to give guilty suspects a better
23
chance at acquittal.
A more sophisticated variant of the fox-hunter's argument exists,
the classic expression of which is in Yale Kamisar's pre-Mirandapaper,
"Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure." 24 The idea is that affluent white suspects will have access
to lawyers as well as some notion of the usefulness of a lawyer, while
poor minority suspects will be at the mercy of police interrogators.
Creating a right to silence and a right to counsel would begin to
equalize these groups.
Focusing, as Kamisar does, on the unequal treatment of individuals ignores the systemic value of truth-seeking. Kamisar's argument is
weaker once it is recast along truth-seeking lines, looking something
like this: even though police interrogation that meets Wigmore's
false-confession test produces only trustworthy responses, all suspects
should have the power to resist the interrogation because a few affluent suspects already know that they need not cooperate. This is like
saying that because the police do not solve white-collar crimes as often
as crimes of violence, the State should release from custody some of
the robbers and muggers.
Kamisar might reject this analogy on the ground that the police
are acting wrongfully in the interrogation room but not when they fail
to solve crimes. But the characterization of police interrogation as
good or bad is the very question presented. Are police acting wrongfully when they seek to solve crimes by using interrogation that produces only trustworthy answers? If the answer is that police do not act
wrongfully in this context, then the unequal treatment of suspects
(along the dimensions of wealth and knowledge) may simply be the
price of solving more crimes.
But reality is, of course, more complex than the argument to this
See GRAo, supra note 1, at 28-29.
This argument has survived persistent criticism. Jeremy Bentham first exposed its
weakness over a century and a half ago. See 5 JREMY BErHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE 238-39 (London, Hunt & Clarke 1827).
24 See KAmisAR, supra note 10, at 27-40.
22
23
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point suggests. Neither the neat bright line between false confessions
and true confessions, nor the litmus test for determining when police
interrogation is likely to produce false confessions is that easy to
uncover.
Perhaps no matter how carefully courts search for evidence that a
resulting confession was untrustworthy, they will always have a nontrivial number of false confessions.2 5 Assume, for example, that police
interrogation which meets Grano's voluntariness standard produces
two false confessions out of every 100 confessions. Assume also that
eighty percent of suspects will eventually confess or be convicted in
the absence of interrogation. 2 6 If interrogation were forbidden, the
state would lose eighteen true confessions, and presumably eighteen
convictions, along with the two false confessions. The choice, on
these assumed empirical findings, is between losing eighteen true con27
fessions or admitting two false ones. This is not an easy choice.
Grano dismisses this argument, citing the lack of empirical evidence that false confessions occur often. But he oversimplifies the
problem, noting only two reasons why someone would give a false con28
fession-to shield the real offender or because of an infirm mind.

Here, and throughout the book, Grano seems to assume a rigid dichotomy between true and false, as well as between innocent and
guilty. Reality is less orderly than Grano's model implies.
Grano's model envisions, for example, a simple assertion that D
hit V in Joe's Bar & Grill on the night in question. It is either true or
25 Sam Pillsbury expressed to me the related concern that police violence against suspects would increase if limitations on interrogation were reduced to those entailed by the
voluntariness doctrine. This is doubtful, given the equally promising, but less hazardous,
route of using psychological ploys, such as lying to suspects about the amount of evidence
the police have against them. If, however, violence would increase under a more permissive view toward interrogation, that would be an added consequentialist reason to retain
more restrictive limits on interrogation.
26 This is not an outrageous assumption. Several studies have concluded that confessions are essential to conviction in a relatively small percentage of cases. See, e.g., David W.
Neubauer, Confssion in PrairieCity: Some Causes and Effects, 65J. CIuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
103, 110 (1974) (Table 4) (finding charges dismissed in only 11% of the cases where the
suspects did not confess; another 19% of these suspects went to trial, where an undisclosed
number would have been found guilty). But Neubauer concludes that greater concessions
are made in the plea bargaining process when suspects do not confess, meaning that there
is a cost to the lack of a confession over and above a decline in the conviction rate. Moreover, it is not known how many cases were never filed because an initial interrogation did
not produce a confession.
27 As Don Dripps pointed out, the choice is potentially even more difficult than the
numbers imply. What if the false confessions are to relatively trivial crimes and some of the
18 lost true confessions are to brutal murders? While I am unaware of data suggesting this
bias, it makes sense that defendants as a group would be less likely to confess falsely, and
more likely to remain silent, as the threatened criminal penalty becomes more severe.
28 GRANo, supra note 1, at 54.
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false. And no one would falsely confess. But the assertion that D hit V
is susceptible to a more complex understanding, which may be more
typical. Suppose D admits hitting V but claims self-defense. Following
a long interrogation, D agrees to a version of the encounter that minimizes V's actual aggression. Notice that D has made a false confession, with both "false" and "confession" broadly defined, and the issue
of guilt is undetermined. That is, there is a false confession, but it is
not known whether D has a valid self-defense claim.
Ajury can never know the validity of the self-defense claim unless
it hears the full and accurate story. 29 Now that D has given a somewhat distorted version, inimical to his own interests, the jury will never
be able to return a verdict based on an accurate rendition of the
event. In short, it will never be clear whether D is actually guilty. So
while the criminal justice system should worry about police interrogation producing a false confession in this illustration, there is no inevitable link between suppressing that confession, or not getting it in the
first place, and a guilty suspect walking free.
Rather than empirical evidence on the false confession question,
Grano relies on a generalized assertion that additional pressure (short
30
of coercion) would produce more true statements than false ones.
But surely Grano is not arguing that the value of a true confession
offsets the cost of a false confession. It seems self-evident that an erroneous conviction based on a false confession is more costly than an
acquittal that results from a confession never given (or later suppressed). Grano fails to discuss two studies that address the erroneous
conviction/false confession problem. Though neither study finds a
large number of erroneous convictions, one concludes that the error
rate may be as high as one percent, with Miranda in place,3 1 and the
other identifies false confessions as a leading source of erroneous
32
convictions.
Neither study will persuade Grano. Indeed, neither fully persuades me that false confessions will increase if the Miranda limitations on interrogation are removed. But that risk exists, and Grano
does not avoid it by citing the lack of empirical evidence or genera29 Epistemological difficulties arise once one begins to talk about "accurate" depictions
of reality. For a discussion of some of these difficulties, see George C. Thomas 1I & Barry
S. Pollack, Rethinking Guilt, Juries,andJeopardy, 91 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1992). The illustration
in the text, however, presupposes that D's confession is less than accurate.
30 GRANo, supra note 1, at 55.
31 C. Ronald Huff et al., Guilty Until ProvenInnocent: Wrongfid Conviction and Public Policy,
32 CaiE & DEumNQ. 518 (1986); id. at 524 (noting the existence of Miranda,as well as the
right to counsel and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
52 Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L Radelet, MiscaniagesofJustice in Potentially Capital Cases,
40 STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987).
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lized value judgments about the need to advance the search for truth.
A second argument tentatively justifies hostility to all police interrogation. It is neither a consequentialist argument that the system will
be better with less interrogation, nor a reliance on some abstract notion of fairness. It is instead a deontological argument along the lines
of autonomy. Granted, it must be a limited form of autonomy and
much work has to be done to state its contours a;ndjustifications. And
granted, Donald Dripps and David Dolinko have rejected a form of
this argument in well-reasoned papers.33 This review is not the place
to do the hard work necessary to overcome their objections, but a
rough form of the argument follows.34
Thomas Hobbes premised the right not to answer questions
posed by the sovereign squarely on the natural law of self-preservation.3 5 As stated, this principle is too broad to define a zone of protected autonomy, because the sovereign can uncontroversially require
its citizens to do other acts that infringe upon a right of self-preservation. For example, the sovereign can draft its citizens for military service in war-time, and it can force them to produce incriminating
evidence that is non-testimonial. But there may be a sense in which
the right to silence is importantly different than these other examples
of self-preservation. Self-incrimination is both self-harming and selfaccusing. Perhaps the sovereign intrudes on a narrow autonomous
sphere when it encourages self-hanning self-accusation.
On this view, it is plausible to talk about an ethical or moral right
to silence. Indeed, Kent Greenawalt has cautiously suggested a selfpreservation deontological principle as a justification for the Fifth
Amendment privilege.3 6 A similar notion informs William Stuntz's argument that the privilege obviates the need to excuse perjury that
would naturally result in the absence of the privilege.3 7 Grano does
33 See David Dolinko, Is There a Rationa&for the Privilege Against Sef-Incrimination?, 33
UCLA. L. REv. 1063 (1986); Donald A. Dripps, Foreward..AgainstPolice Interrogation-Andthe
PrhidlegeAgainstSeIncrimination,78J. GluM. L & CiuMrNoLoy 699 (1988). Dripps has also

responded to a self-accusing deonotological argument in a draft paper of mine. See Donald A. Dripps, SeyInaimination and Self-Preservation A Skeptical Vew, 1991 U. ILL. L RE;v.
329.
34 A reader of a draft of this review commented that it was unfair to the reader and to
Grano to raise an argument without fully explicating and defending it. Fair or not, raising
every ethical counter-argument is a sign of respect for Grano's critique, and the deontological argument would require a lengthy defense.
35 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 27 (London, Dutton 1651) ("If a man be interrogated by the sovereign, or his authority, concerning a crime done by himself, he is not
bound, without assurance of pardon, to confess it; because no man... can be obliged...
to accuse himself'). '
36 Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and ConstitutionalRight 23 WM. & MARY L Rv.
15, 39 (1981).
37 WilliamJ. Stuntz, Self-Inaimination and Excu 88 COLUM. L REv. 1227 (1988). Bill
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not address the self-preservation deontological principle.
If false confessions would increase substantially without Miranda,
or if a deontological justification for a right to silence can be defended, general hostility toward police interrogation could be justified. Perhaps even a complete ban on interrogation could be
justified. Both grounds are speculative, however, and it is fair to assume for purposes of reviewing Grano's book that he is correct in
finding no ethical basis to oppose interrogation that complies with the
voluntariness standard. That raises the question of whether a legal
basis can exist in the rarified air of Grano's ethical universe.
III.

INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

If there is no ethical basis to be hostile to police interrogation, is
there a legal basis? Kamisar's 1965 "Equal Justice" paper presents a
legal argument to ban police interrogation that is, at once, simple and
profound.3 8 If the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to the interrogation room like it applies in criminal trials,
then the police should not, at a minimum, be able to ask questions of
uncounseled suspects.
Consider the text of the Fifth Amendment: no person "shall be
39
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
Compulsion is understood, in the trial context, to mean calling the
defendant as a witness. Asking questions of suspects might be analogous to calling a defendant as a witness. 40 When the responses are
later introduced at trial, these suspects are being witnesses against
themselves just as surely as if they were testifying from the witness
stand.
Consider the historical argument. As no police force existed in
1792, the right not to be compelled to be a witness was intended to
prohibit judicial questioning by magistrates, which was the practice in
England during this era. Questioning by magistrates was investigative
Stuntz helpfully pointed out in a letter that "self-preservation theories" might not "have
anything at all to do with police interrogation. The key here is that lying in the police
station does not ordinarily lead to any sanctions at all. Thus there is no strong self-preservation argument for a right to silence in the police station." Letter from WilliamJ. Stuntz
to George C. Thomas III, (Nov. 7, 1994). While Stuntz is right at a theoretical level, this is
the same type of pragmatic mistake Grano makes when assuming a simple dichotomy between true and false confessions. Many "confessions" are nothing more than a series of
inconsistent lies which turn out to be incriminating. Thus, lying in response to police
interrogation does have the practicalsanction of often resulting in self-incrimination.
38 See KAmisAR, supra note 10.
39 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
40 This analogy is less apt that it first appears. See infra notes 56 to 59 and accompanying text.
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in nature, and it is logical to conclude that when police inherited that
function from the magistrates, they also inherited the ban on questioning that the privilege against self-incrimination creates in the
courtroom. Grano's legal argument to the contrary is not persuasive.
Essentially, it relies on two aspects of current Supreme Court doctrine:
(1) targets of grand jury investigations have no general immunity
from questioning and must, instead, affirmatively claim the protection
of the Fifth Amendment; and (2) targets of police interrogation who
are not in custody have no right to receive the Mirandawarnings and
41
thus must also claim the privilege.
It is possible to distinguish, on Fifth Amendment privilege
grounds, the suspect in custody from the target of a grand jury probe
or a suspect who is not in custody. But even if these situations are
indistinguishable, the grand jury and non-custodial rules were the
product of later Courts42 that were more hostile to Miranda.4 3
To dismiss Kamisar's 1965 argument based on post-Miranda developments is hardly persuasive. Kamisar's analogy may be inapt, but
Grano does not demonstrate that by using later cases, which might
have come out differently on Kanisar's view of the Fifth Amendment.
Thus, a plausible legal basis exists to ban all police interrogation or all
interrogation in the absence of counsel. But the argument is only
plausible. Indeed, Kamisar wrote in 1965, "I do not contend that 'the
implication[s] of a tangled and obscure history' dictate that the privilege apply to the police station, only that they permit it."44
Kamisar's concession may doom his argument. If both his and
Grano's interpretation of the privilege are eligible interpretations,
then the ground shifts to the political morality stage. But the arguments on Kamisar's side-the concern about equality and false confessions as well as the claim that a deontological right to silence
exists-are far from overwhelming. Thus, Grano's interpretation may
be preferable to Kamisar's-not, as Grano seems to think, because the
legal doctrine has developed in that direction, but because of the
force of his critique of the ethical arguments offered to oppose
interrogation.
On Grano's view that no generalized hostility toward police inter41 GPANo, supra note 1, at 134.
42 See United States v. Washington,

431 U.S. 181, 186-90 (1977) (grand jury rule);
United States v. Mandjuano, 425 U.S. 564, 580-81 (1976) (same) (plurality opinion); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (non-custody rule).
43 The Court in Mirandalimited the formulation of its holding to custodial interrogation, but that was dicta; none of the four cases involved non-custodial interrogation.
44 Kwsis A, supranote 10, at 36 (quoting Bernard D. Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarranAct, and the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CHI. L REv. 687, 695 (1951)).
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rogation is either ethically or legally indicated, the next question is
what constitutionalprotection exists in the interrogation room. The
answer is that, at a minimum, the Constitution protects against coercive interrogation. This protection would arise either from the Fifth
Amendment (applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment) or from the Due Process Clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Grano's discussion of coercion is cogent, illuminating, and persuasive. He makes use of the rich philosophical literature without losing his legal focus. He skillfully uses Supreme Court cases to illustrate
his points, and he presents these points in an even-handed way,
designed to appeal to Mirandasupporters as well as to Mirandacritics.
He concludes that coercion inevitably requires two normative judgments-one about the wrongfulness of the coercer's conduct and a
second about the degree of pressure that the coerced party must bear
before it is plausible to say that no reasonable choice or acceptable
alternative was available. Grano correctly points out that "no agenda
is hidden in this analysis .... Those who are hostile to police interrogation remain free to argue that even the slightest pressure is 'wrongful' and that such pressure confronts the defendant with
'unacceptable' alternatives." 45
Grano's analysis of coercion is philosophically and pragmatically
astute. At least as far back as Aristotle, philosophers have attempted
to state the conditions under which coercion occurs-most accounts
are similar to Grano's-but no philosopher can produce a formula
that mechanically answers the questions of when conduct is wrongful
and when only unacceptable alternatives remain open. Those judgments must be made on a case-by-case basis, something the commonlaw judges did for over 100 years prior to the adoption of the Bill of
Rights; something American judges did for over 150 years under the
guise of the so-called "voluntariness" doctrine in the pre-Mirandadays.
Voluntariness seems to imply an act that is free from coercion,
but courts have used the same terminology to suppress confessions
obtained by police methods that were unfair but not coercive (recall
Grano's example about police posing as a chaplain or defense lawyer).
For the most part, though, courts have viewed trickery as fair because
it is part of the search for truth. Under the voluntariness test, police
may lie to the suspect about the amount of evidence they have and use
other techniques designed to make the suspect feel hopeless. Grano
approves of these tactics. 46 Indeed, except for lying to suspects about
45

G A'o, supranote 1, at 67.

46 Id. at 112-14.
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their legal rights, and using impostors to play a lawyer, doctor, or
priest, it is not clear that there is any content to the fairness prong of
the voluntariness doctrine. Nor does Grano offer any guidance here.
He states that " [r] espect for the individual as an individual, as a member of humanity, yields limits on what will be permitted in the otherwise laudable search for truth."4 7 But except for lying about legal
rights and posing as professionals deserving of trust, not much is
known about what those limits look like, despite 250 years of voluntariness doctrine.
This is not a criticism of the common law or of Grano. It is intended to recall for the reader a glimpse of what the pre-Miranda
world looked like. Whateirer else critics may say about Miranda,they
cannot deny that the Court attempted to clarify the limits on police
interrogation. Grano's coercion test suffers from the uncertainties of
most philosophical tests of coercion,4 8 but it is a model of clarity beside his fairness prong of voluntariness.
Nonetheless, Grano is correct that mere interrogation by police
would not be enough to make the response involuntary under either
prong of the common law view of voluntariness. Although the common law contains some contrary evidence, Grano correctly points out
that most of the contrary evidence comes from English cases, virtually
all of which occurred after 1792. He and George Dix are correct in
concluding that early American courts showed little solicitude for suspects who were being interrogated. 49
And, of course, if mere interrogation of suspects in police custody
does not always trigger an involuntary or coerced response, Mirandds
central premise collapses. The Court held that all custodial interrogation is coercive, based on the "inherently compelling pressures which
work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely."50 This finding has
been Miranda's Achilles' heel. Justice White quickly found the ultimate hard case: the police ask the single question, "Do you have anything to say?" To find coercion there, White argued, is contrary to
common sense and is "patently unsound."5 '
47 Id. at

82.

Robert Nozick's test achieves a relative degree of precision. For an application of
Nozick's test to the self-incrimination issue, see Thomas, supra note 5.
49 See Gnmo, supra note 1, at 131; George Dix, Mistake, Ignorance,Expectation of Benefit,
and the Modem Law of Confessions, 1975 WAsH. U. L.Q. 275, 281-84.
50 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
51 Id. at 533-34 (White, J., dissenting). Fifteen years later, Justice White wrote the
Court's opinion reaffirming (and arguably expanding) Mirandain Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (1981). Perhaps White came to see that Miranda was a workable solution; or
perhaps he came to see that it did not make much difference in the confession rate. See
48
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Grano's attack on the inherent-coercion premise of Miranda is
hardly a new line of attack, for him or for other Miranda critics. Miranda defenders are not totally bereft of ammunition on this issue.
For example, Kamisar has drawn a distinction between Fifth Amendment compulsion and the common law prohibition of involuntary or
coerced confessions. 52 On this view, one does not have to point to a
specific question or threat that overbears the will; rather, given the
inherent level of compulsion generated by arrest and detention, it is
plausible to define Fifth Amendment compulsion as any police conduct "designed and likely to pressure or persuade" suspects to incriminate themselves, 53 perhaps including all interrogation.
Stephen Schulhofer agrees that Fifth Amendment compulsion is
a different concept than common law involuntariness. He too argues
that compulsion is best understood as impermissible pressure. On
this understanding, it was appropriate for the Supreme Court to erect
Miranda's conclusive presumption that every response to custodial interrogation is compelled (in the absence of warnings and waiver).54
But there are grave conceptual difficulties here. While compulsion may not be exactly the same concept as coercion, they are closely
linked.5 5 The Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling a defendant "in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Literally construed,
this forbids forcing a defendant to take the witness stand and answer
questions under threat of contempt of court. Using this as a model,
compulsion must mean a level of pressure sufficient to deprive the
defendant of a meaningful choice.
For example, no judge would recognize a Fifth Amendment
claim that the defendant was compelled to take the witness stand by
the effective case put on by the state. The defendant was undoubtedly
under great pressure, but he retained a meaningful choice about testifying. It could be said that the state's presentation caused the defendant to testify, but it is not linguistically or conceptually sound to say
that it compelled him to testify.
Similarly, the claim that the generalized pressure in the interrogation room compels a suspect to speak is suspiciously close to the
claim that the pressure caused him to speak. Whatever Fifth Amendinfra note 79 and accompanying text.
52 KAMtSAR, supra note 10, at 160.
53 Id.
54 StephenJ. Schulhofer, ReconsideringMiranda, 54 U. CHi. L. R wv.
435, 453 (1987). To
read Mirandaas imposing a conclusive presumption about coercion leads to a slight recasting of the argument: can the Court legitimately impose this kind of presumption on state
courts? Grano says the Court lacks that power. GRNo, supra note 1, at 195-98.
55 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 83-85.
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ment compulsion may be, it must be more than mere causation.
Otherwise, as Justice Jackson intimated, the ordinary mechanics of
arrest and detention would be held to compel all subsequent
56
statements.
Consider the suspect who, faced with police interrogation, begins
to answer questions after one or two hours. He may have felt that he
had no choice, but other explanations are equally plausible. Why, for
example, did he answer at that point? Perhaps interrogation contains
a cumulative coercive quality. This is certainly the point Kamisar and
Schulhofer make in their defense of Miranda's inherent-compulsion
rationale. Indeed, Kamisar would say that Justice White's one-question hypothetical is not a "real" case; the "real" cases involve sustained
57
questioning.
But the suspect in the above hypothetical suffered no penalty for
his refusal to answer the first hour's worth of questions. Thus, one
explanation of why he answered at a particular point is that he decided it would benefit him. Perhaps he wanted to salve his conscience. Perhaps he decided that he could tell a story that would
persuade the police to release him.58 Perhaps he decided that the
police had sufficient evidence, and he just wanted to get it over with.
Though the police are clearly causal agents in all three of these alternative explanations, there is no coercion and no compulsion of the
type inherent in being subpoenaed to testify.
Therefore, the analogy to the courtroom may be inapt. The
threat of contempt creates compulsion in the courtroom context,
which suggests that Fifth Amendment compulsion is roughly coextensive With coercion and with common law involuntariness. This is inconsistent with the ethical analysis suggested earlier. If the state did
not coerce the confession, why should the confession be unavailable
to the state? That the defendant acted unfreely in some sense does
not seem sufficient to deny the state the use of presumptively truthful
evidence that it did not coerce. 59
Justice White's common-sense repudiation of inherent coercion
seems, therefore, as sound as any attempt to demonstrate inherent
coercion or to deny that coercion is the right test. Accepting White's
and Grano's indictment of Miranda's inherent coercion rationale,
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 161 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Professor Kamisar made this point to me on the telephone.
58 For a more thorough development of this argument, see Thomas, supra note 5, at
103-05.
59 Depending on one's view of free will, it is possible that every act is unfree in some
sense. Harry Frankfurt acknowledges this possibility, and argues that it does not relieve
people of responsibility. See Frankfurt, supra note 20.
56
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only two moves seem plausible for those who favor per se constitutional limits on police interrogation. First, there is the move the
Supreme Court has already made. In 1974, the Court began to intimate that Miranda is a prophylactic doctrine designed to prevent the
admission of involuntary confessions by preventing the admission of a
larger universe of confessions. 60 By 1985, the Court could say, almost
glibly, "The Miranda exclusionary rule ... serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It
may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment
violation." 6 1
The Court has conceded that "in the individual case, Miranda's
preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has
suffered no identifiable constitutional hann." 62 Can the federal
courts reverse a state court conviction without finding an identifiable
federal constitutional harm? Grano says they cannot.6 3 The contrary
argument requires an account of constitutional interpretation that
permits federal courts to impose on states conclusive presumptions.
The argument is not without difficulty.
The second move that could save per se limits on interrogation is
superficially more promising. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel
could be applied to custodial interrogation and thus require a Johnson
v. Zerbst64 knowing and intelligent waiver. While this kind of waiver
might require more than the current Miranda procedure, it surely
would not require less. Extending the Sixth Amendment to the interrogation room would, therefore, accomplish Miranda's purpose without the troubling inherent-coercion rationale.
Perhaps the Court made a mistake when it abandoned the Sixth
Amendment as a limitation on police interrogation in favor of the
Fifth Amendment. 65 But there are difficulties, as Grano demonstrates. To begin, neither the text nor history of the right to counsel
supports its extension into the interrogation room-at least not prior
to the filing of charges. The text guarantees to the "accused" "in all
criminal prosecutions" the right "to have assistance of counsel for his
defence." A suspect who is under arrest, on bare probable cause, and
who is sitting in a police interrogation room hardly fits the picture
60 See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
61 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985).
62 Id. at 307.
63 GRAuo, supra note 1, at 185-98.
64 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
65 This move happened between 1964 and 1966. CompareEscobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.

478 (1964) (finding Sixth Amendment limitations on police interrogation) with Miranda
(expressly locating its holding in the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
and explaining that Escobedo could be understood as a Fifth Amendment case).
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created by the text. Where is the criminal prosecution? Is a suspect
transformed into an accused by a mere arrest? Finally, and Grano
believes most importantly, whatever a lawyer could do for a suspect in
the interrogation room would not constitute "assistance for his
66
defence."
These are powerful arguments. Blackstone, who was harshly critical of the English rule forbidding counsel in capital cases, understood
both "assistance of counsel" and "defence" to take place during the
trial itself.6 7 But the policy argument is even more significant than the
68
text or the history.
The policy behind the right to counsel is to advance the accuracy
of the process. Requiring lawyers in the interrogation room would
substantially undermine this policy goal. If one assumes that interrogation under Grano's voluntariness standard produces only (or
mostly) truthful responses, having lawyers present to discourage these
responses would not further the policy goal of advancing accuracy.
Most importantly, changing the constitutional justification for
per se limits on police interrogation would not change the ethical
calculus. Thus, unless someone can find an ethical basis to oppose
police interrogation generally, the principle of choosing the most ethical among competing interpretations suggests that there should be
no per se limitations on police interrogation derived from either the
Fifth or Sixth Amendments.
IV.

A

WORLD WITHOUT MRANDA,

If the Court overruled Miranda,and the criminal justice system

lacked a sufficient justification for limitations on police interrogation
that extend beyond the voluntariness standard, the world might not

be any different. It would at least be more candid about the inevitable
tension that exists in the simultaneous commitment to police interrogation and to the privilege against self-incrimination. Though a defender of Miranda,Schulhofer has observed that Miranda"is infinitely
less candid than the due process balancing analysis" in permitting

people to think that they can serve both halves of this dichotomy. 69

Grano accepts the requirement that involuntary confessions be
suppressed, without regard to whether they are true or false. This requirement inheres in the Due Process Clause, as the Court held in
66
67
68
69

Gaao, supra note 1, at 157-60.
4 WiLuAm BLACxsToNE, ComamrA~ms 355.
GRAao, supra note 1, at 158-64.

Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 Msfim. L. Rmv. 865, 884 (1981)
(reviewing KAMisA., supra note 10).
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1936 when it invalidated a state conviction based on a coerced confession. 70 To be sure, a universe of difficult voluntariness questions
would exist, and the close cases would be susceptible to different answers. Under the coercion prong, courts must decide whether the police conduct was wrongful and whether the suspect had a reasonable
(acceptable) alternative to confessing; under the fairness prong, even
fewer guidelines exist to assist courts. But Miranda has spawned ajurisprudence that is far more baroque than anything that existed under
the common law voluntariness standard. Difficult questions arise
about the form of the warnings, whether the suspect was in custody,
whether the police interrogated the suspect, and whether the suspect
waived her rights. On all of these issues, close cases can come out
either way, perhaps depending on a court's view of the voluntariness
of the suspect's response.
Mirandahas been condemned asjudicial legislation. This is a fair
charge, but the post-Miranda experience is evidence of an inherent
limit on legal positivism. If the law-giver creates a rule that does not
comport with the relevant consensus, the rule will be eroded in application and interpretation until it approximates the relevant consensus. 71 In the case of Miranda,Justice White's common-sense rejection
of inherent coercion was closer to the consensus among judges than
Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion. Thus, courts quickly found
the stress points in the Miranda rule (custody, interrogation, waiver)
and created a vast jurisprudence in which legions of close cases exist.
And when the cases are close, judges can decide them based on
whether they believe the suspect was coerced or otherwise treated
unfairly.
To take one example, many commentators noted the strength of
the defendant's argument that he was interrogated in violation of Mirandain Rhode Island v. Inni. 72 But Innis lost, probably because, there
was little evidence that he was coerced. 73 Grano criticizes Innis be70 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

71 For a more detailed examination of this point, see George C. Thomas III & Barry S.
Pollack, Saving Rights From a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth Amendment 73 B.U. L. REv.
147 (1993); George C. Thomas III, Legal Skepticism and the GravitationalEffect of Law, 43
RUTGERS L. REv. 965 (1991).
72 446 U.S. 291 (1980). See, e.g., Welsh White, Interrogationwithout Questions: Rhode
Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209 (1980).
73 The issue was whether the police interrogated Innis by discussing in his presence the
possibility that a handicapped little girl might find the murder weapon, a sawed-off shotgun, and "maybe kill herself." (A school for handicapped children was located in the
area.) Interrogation, the Court said, was any conduct that the police should know is rea-

sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. While one can quibble about what "reasonably likely" means in probability terms, the technique used in Innis was clearly designed
to accomplish the goal of interrogation-to encourage the suspect to make an incriminat-
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cause its "treatment of the interrogation issue" is "devoid of a Fifth
Amendment underpinning." 74 I agree with that criticism, but make a
broader claim here: in close Miranda cases, courts tend to defer to
their judgment about whether the suspect's response was involuntary.
As a jurisprudential matter, then, Mirandamay have resulted in
the creation of a more complex jurisprudence in which the voluntariness issue is submerged, but still of critical importance. If so, that
argues for overruling Miranda. If courts are going to decide cases
based on whether the suspect's response was voluntary, they should
not bury the issue beneath a blizzard of words about the definition of
custody (the functional equivalent of arrest),75 the definition of interrogation (any conduct which the police should know is likely to elicit
an incriminating response), 76 and the intractable problem of waiver
(how can suspects who are subjected to inherent coercion validly
waive their Mirandarights?).77
Before joining Grano's chorus, however, it is advisable to consider carefully the non-jurisprudential reasons to keep Miranda. A
traditional argument against removing an outmoded prohibition is
that removal may send a different message than never having enacted
the prohibition. Overruling Mirandamight cause the police to believe
that people do not care how they extract confessions. Similarly, to the
extent Mirandawas a symbolic victory for the oppressed and disadvantaged,78 overruling it would convey the message that the legal system
does not care about the disadvantaged and oppressed. Grano notes
the latter concern, but finds it less troubling than leaving intact Miranda's message that the criminal justice system is indifferent to the
search for truth and that criminals are, in some sense, victims of
society.
This exaggerates the significance of Miranda's message. Society
sends countless messages, in many different forms, that reaffirm the
importance of solving crimes and the individual responsibility of offenders. Moreover, Miranda is old news. To leave it in place-a
lonely, middle-aged voice affirming (even if only symbolically) the
equality and power of the suspect-is hardly going to destroy society's
ing disclosure. But the technique was not coercive under the voluntariness standard.
Although the police made the choice of saying nothing potentially more costly, they hardly
made it costly enough to give Innis no acceptable alternative to disclosing the location of
the weapon.
74 GRANo,supra note 1, at 209.
75 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
76 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
77 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting).
78 See Stanley Ingber, Procedure,.Ceremony and Rhetoric: The Minimization ofIdeological Conflict in Deviance Contro4 56 B.U. L. REV. 266, 294 (1976).
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moral structure. But to overrule Mirandawould not be old news. It
would be a major victory for those who believe in the basic goodness
of police and authority, and in the basic badness of those who are
arrested. This is far more troubling than Grano's treatment of it
implies.
A related reason not to overrule Mirandais that, on the surface at
least, it moves toward the equality among suspects that Kamisar called
for in his 1965 essay. It seems to permit all suspects to make intelligent decisions about whether to cooperate with the police, not just
the suspects who can afford to consult with lawyers. Of course, even
assuming that this is an ethical principle that outweighs the loss of
truthful confessions, there is a major empirical issue here: do suspects
actually avail themselves of the protections promised in the Miranda
warnings?
It may be, however, that Grano wins either way. If Mirandadoes
not permit suspects to make an informed choice about whether to talk
to police, then it is not furthering the equality goal. On the other
hand, if the decline in the confessions rate turns out to be one-third,
as found in one study,7 9 this major loss of confessions, and consequent
sacrifice of the truth objective, could outweigh the equality objective.
Without an ethical justification to oppose police interrogation,
Miranda supporters may be forever impaled on the horns of the dilemma created by Grano's truth objective and the question of Miranda'seffectiveness. If Mirandais generally effective, it benefits guilty
suspects because of an unjustified hostility toward police interrogation. If Mirandais not generally effective, why should courts suppress
confessions of guilty suspects just because the police failed to do what
would likely not have made any difference? Grano does not make the
argument in quite this way, but forcing Mirandasupporters to respond
to this dilemma creates more difficulties than any potential doctrinal
argument.
Rejecting symbolism as an insufficientjustification, and rejecting
fear of false confessions and support for autonomy as unproven justifications, leaves only a single conceptual argument: the retreat to the
inherent-coercion argument that the Court pressed in Miranda. My
defense of Miranda,in response to Grano's indictment, thus seems to
come down to inherent coercion. And I remain haunted by Justice
White's observation that this rationale requires a finding of coercion
when the suspect answers the single question: "Do you have anything
79 See Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Mirandain Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 11 (1967) (Table 1) (showing a decline in the overall
confessions rate following Mirandafrom 54.4% to 37.5%).
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to say?"
Maybe, as someone suspected of supporting Miranda,my answer
is, "No."

